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Abstract: Notoriously, state-building is a key enterprise in regard of addressing the 
international conflicts throughout the globe. The consolidation of peace associated to it is 
intimately connected with the institutionalization of liberal ideas in structuring realms such 
as the political, the economical and the social spheres. Departing from Foucauldian 
concepts such as dispositif, government, discipline and biopolitics, this paper aims to 
critically analyze the post-conflict state-building practice. In a first moment, the paper 
delineates how peace was operationalized during the Cold War and post-Cold War 
periods. In a second moment, it will present the Foucauldian conceptual tools that enables 
the (re)problematization of the state-building practice as a post-conflict normalizing 
dispositif, rather than merely a conflict-resolution tool. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
There is no absurd in saying that it is already common-sense that peacekeeping, 
peacebuilding and state-building constitute the very core of the international 
political policies in regard of peace in our time. Nevertheless, despite all these great 
efforts and the fact that “build[ing a] sustainable peace is a major challenge facing 
the international community” in our time (UNSC, 2008: 3), the reflection about 
such important and crucial theme, such as peace, still remains oddly marginal 
inside the discipline of International Relations (IR) (Richmond, 2008a, b).  
Certainly, there is an impressive number of studies regarding peacebuilding, 
peacekeeping or state-building. However, their problematizations are often shallow 
and most of them are underpinning by a ‘problem-solving’2 understanding of the 
world and, consequently, in regard of the construction of international peace. 
Hence, they are often “under-theorized” (Bellamy, 2004: 1), frequently 
“idiosyncratic and atheoretical” (Bures, 2007: 1), engaging in enclosed discussions 
usually distant, or having no relationship at all, with IR (Bellamy, 2004: 2) or 
Political Science theories as a whole, and generally having their inquiring narrowly 
limited by their policy relevance (Paris, 2000: 1; 7). It is precisely the critical analysis 
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that evinces that this kind of reflection and epistemology regarding the 
international political policies related to peace are not neutral or impartial. Quite 
the contrary, «[they] attempt to create and recreate a particular type of international 
order, (…) [where] the type of order sustained is a distinctly liberal one» (Bellamy e 
Williams, 2004: 8).  
In this context, this paper aims, to discuss the UN model regarding the 
transformation of the international violent conflicts making use of the reflections 
and the conceptual instruments developed by the French philosopher Michel 
Foucault. Departing from a Foucauldian standpoint, it is possible to understand 
the construction of peace in our time as a process of international normalization of 
‘post-conflict’ states and their populations. This normalization is operated 
essentially through the state-building practice. It occurs through the government of 
the ‘post-conflict’ states, through their discipline, and of their populations, through 
the biopower exercised over their lives. In order to elucidate such argument, the 
paper will, in a first moment, delineate how peace was operationalized during the 
Cold War and post-Cold War periods. In a second moment, it will present the 
Foucauldian conceptual tools that enables the (re)problematization of the state-
building practice as a post-conflict normalizing dispositif, rather than merely a 
conflict-resolution tool. 
 
PEACE IN THE POST-COLD WAR SCENARIO 
 
For a long time, much of the reflection about peacekeeping was limited to 
diplomats and practitioners in the field (Fetherston, 2000: 191). Peacekeeping was 
initially reflected as mere instrument of «conflict management, conflict 
containment or conflict suppression, dealing within symptoms and not concerned 
with fundamental resolution» (Ramsbotham e Woodhouse, 2000: 5). Not by 
coincidence, right after the World War II, and during the whole period of the Cold 
War, the main UN activity in violent-conflict scenarios was peacekeeping, which 
usually meant the deployment of a small military force aiming just to monitor the 
ceasefire, or patrol, a neutral territory between former combatants3 (Paris e Sisk, 
2009b: 4). 
It was only with the end of the Cold War that this situation changed. 
Firstly, with the end of the Cold War not only several issues gained more relevance 
in the international scene, but also they were rationalized differently. This was the 
case of the intra-state violent conflicts. Although they represent most of the violent 
conflicts in the post-World-War-II period (Harbom e Wallensteen, 2010: 503), they 
were frequently framed within a Cold War mentality which usually disregarded the 
domestic structural causes of these conflicts. Secondly, with the end of East-West 
tensions, both superpowers were not willing to maintain high levels of military 
expenditure, or economic assistance to allies perceived as non-strategic. This 
allowed other international actors, such as the UN and its agencies, to become 
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much more active in the processes of ending and transforming violent conflicts 
throughout the globe. These two reasons leaded to a high ‘demand’ of UN peace 
operations4 at the international scene. Indeed, the number of peace operations 
deployed in the decade from 1989 to 1999 was more than the double of the ones 
deployed in the previous four decades together (Paris, 2004: 16-17). Thirdly, 
without the previous ideological tension, and the adding triumphant spirit of the 
West (perhaps most iconic in Fukuyama’s (1992) End of History), there was little 
debate about how the domestic design of the states should look like. Indeed, 
Fukuyama was bluntly clear proclaiming the «end point in mankind’s ideological 
evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form 
of human governance» (1989: 4). It was more than clear that now the states should 
all resemble liberal democracies. 
Obviously, the reflection about peace in the international sphere was not 
immune to this rationale. When more attention was given to the domestic structure 
of the conflicts, more fundamental questions of these conflicts started to be the 
main concern: its root causes. At this point, the reflection of the Peace Studies,5 
discipline which advocates the exercise of other activities beyond the simple 
cessation of violent hostilities between states in order to build peace, was 
recovered, incorporating its concern with the overcome of the economic, political 
and social structures that prevent the satisfaction of the basic needs of the 
individuals in conflict. The main concern became the resolution of the conflicts 
rather than their mere management (Bures, 2007: 9-10). It is at this point that 
peacebuilding enters the UN’s vocabulary. 
Whereas, on the one hand, the transformation of the internal structures of 
the conflicts became more prominent, it was also clear, on the other hand, the path 
that should be followed and how the domestic structures should resemble. In an 
international environment distinctly marked by the liberal euphoria, it was barely 
discussible that the domestic structures of the states should be modified so these 
could become liberal democracies and consequently more pacific. The rationale 
was underpinned essentially by the reflections of “Kant, Schumpeter, and many 
other contemporary authors, [that] have argued that liberalism has a pacifying 
effect through liberal, democratic principles which are the basis for state 
institutions, and through its adherence to free trade and capitalism”6 (Richmond, 
2008a: 89-90). This rationale was propelled to the international policies directed to 
peace and was materialized in the Agenda for Peace (1992), where the UN delineated 
its instruments directed to the construction of international peace, and 
consequently became a pivotal document regarding the international peace in the 
post-Cold-War world. The UN involvement, with the pass of time, became 
concerned not only with the provision of security, but also with the 
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democratization through election and the marketization of the economy, and 
specially with the functioning of public administration systems, creation of 
institutions, and strengthening of the state’s capacity to provide services to its 
populations. It is at this point, where the focus is the creation of political 
institutions, the enhancement of the state capacity, and the functioning of the 
state-society relations, that state-building becomes a key activity regarding 
peacebuilding (Manning, 2003; Brahimi, 2007; Paris e Sisk, 2009a: Chapter 1). 
 
POST-CONFLICT STATE-BUILDING 
 
State-building has become a crucial activity and one of the most pressing issues 
regarding peace in contemporary international relations. In nowadays’ international 
scenario, state-building is a pivotal instrument used to address issues regarding 
both the international security and development. Despite the apparent distance 
between both discourses7, it is their underlying rationale and the centrality of the 
question of ‘fragility’ that bind them together. Both discourses have as one of their 
primary concerns the ‘fragility’ of the states. This ‘fragility’, understood as «weak 
institutions and governance systems, and a fundamental lack of leadership, political 
will and/or capacity to deliver on key public goods, especially in terms of 
protecting the poor» (Ingram, 2010: 4), is at the very heart of the state-building 
debate. Indeed, the whole state-building agenda emerges as «a direct policy 
response to these conditions» (Ibidem: 5). 
As a practice performed at the international scene in ‘post-conflict’ 
scenarios8, state-building might have more than one understanding. At its narrower 
perspective, state-building deals specifically with its immediate meaning; it focuses 
on the (re)construction of states through the strengthening and/or the (re)creation 
of its institutional apparatuses. In this understanding, ‘post-conflict’ state-building 
is a distinct phase of the reconstruction efforts which primary objective is the 
(re)construction of political institutions (Bickerton, 2007: 96). This phase would be 
a part of the peacebuilding activity and would seek to create effective and 
legitimate governmental institutions (Paris e Sisk, 2007: 1), which would be 
endowed with governance instruments and capable of providing physical and 
economic security to the citizens in question (Chesterman, 2004: 5). In this 
understanding, state-building is intimately connected with state capacity 
(Fukuyama, 2004) and its internal governance (Rotberg, 2004).  In this view, state-
building «refers to efforts to reconstruct, or in some cases to establish for the first 
time, effective and autonomous structures of governance in a state or territory 
where no such capacity exists or where it has been seriously eroded» (Caplan, 2005: 
3). The definition of ‘post-conflict’ state-building as «the strengthening or 
construction of legitimate governmental institutions in countries that are emerging 
from conflicts» advanced by Paris and Sisk’s (2009a: 14) best sums up this 
understanding. 
                                                            
7 Distance very much shortened by the elucidations, for instance, of Mark Duffield (2001, 2007). 
8 For other contexts where ‘state-building’ might take place, see for example (Fritz e Menocal, 2007: 17). 
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In a wider sense, state-building is analyzed well beyond this primary 
institutional understanding. It is analyzed as an international engagement with the 
domestic governing mechanisms of other states and their respective societies. This 
understanding includes much more than the (re)construction and strengthening of 
state institutions, it also reflects upon the whole set of practices on which 
internationals focus on the management and regulation of state-society relations. 
Those practices might vary as international assistance to strengthening the 
regulatory capacity of the state, to conditionalities, debt relief, international loans, 
poverty reduction strategies, and many others (Chandler, 2006). This is a more 
comprehensive understanding of state-building and allows the problematization of 
its practices not only during reconstruction periods, but also in a different set of 
engagement among states and international organizations. In a ‘post-conflict’ 
peacebuilding setting, for instance, this would require the analyst to observe not 
only the ‘post-conflict’ state institutions that are being (re)constructed-
/strengthened, but also the whole set of practices that seek to shape and direct the 
relations between ‘post-conflict’ states and their populations. 
Apparently, it is towards this understanding that the policy-oriented 
reflections are heading to. Observing some key policy papers of the OECD (2008, 
2010), DFID (2009, 2010) and UNDP/WB (Ingram, 2010), it is clear that they are 
responding to the aforementioned criticisms of depolitization, technicality and 
legitimacy. It is saw that the understanding of ‘state-building’ has evolved 
considerably from the mere institution-building and capacity enhancement 
framework to a focus on the state-society relations (Rocha Menocal, 2009: 6). 
Nowadays, in the ‘post-conflict’ scenarios, the relations between the ‘post-conflict’ 
states and their populations are at the heart of the state-building efforts. While in 
the recent past those state-society relations were also targeted, but as a 
consequence of the institutional building/enhancement attempts, current state-
building practices are precisely concerned with them. Now, state-building is 
«essentially concerned with how the state interacts with society» (Ingram, 2010: 6), 
and international state-builders are fundamentally concerned with «how the state 
performs and how it engages with society» (Ibidem: 7; all emphasis in the original). 
Indeed, state-building «entails concentrating on how power and authority are 
distributed and exercised, and this in turn necessitates thinking and working across 
all elements of the state and at the intersection between state and society» (Ibidem: 
24). Nevertheless, this understanding still remains unsaid some elements that are 
important to clarify. Firstly, that the state-building practice has become even more 
invasive and profound. Secondly, that this how the state should perform, this how it 
should interact and engage with the society is internationally pre-given. Finally, that 
the interactions of the ‘post-conflict’ states and their populations are conducted by 
international state-builders towards this pre-given how. In fact, whole populations 
are conducted towards this pre-determined how; toward not only how state should 
relate to the society, but also how the society should act and also relate to the state. 
In both senses, the state-building can be seen as a social (re)engineering 
based on the transposition of values and ideas of the western world to war-torn 
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societies. Either institutionally or through conditionalities, it can be said that the 
final objective is very much the same: the construction of liberal democracies. As 
already said, more often than not, the reflection about the construction of peace is 
centered on a ‘problem-solving’ understanding of the world. Nevertheless, this way 
of seeing things tends to miss much of the picture. It tends to portray the state-
building activity as a neutral conflict-resolution instrument and neglects the power 
relations entrenched in such process.  
It is precisely at this point that the reflection of Michel Foucault is of great 
help. Through a Foucauldian problematic, one is enabled to see that the state-
building activity might be problematized as an instrument of promoting and 
maintaining a certain international order, a liberal one. It enables the visualization 
of deep power relations in what is portrayed as a neutral, even a beneficial, 
relationship between the state-builders and local actors. More than that, his 
reflection and conceptual tools enable the problematization of the state-building 
practice as a normalizing activity in the international scenario, rather than a mere 
conflict-resolution tool addressing the transformation of violent conflicts in war-
torn societies throughout the globe. 
 
FOUCAULDIAN ANALYTICAL TOOLS 
 
This paper proposes that the ‘post-conflict’ state-building processes might be 
examined through a Foucauldian problematic arguing that the state-building 
practice in fact is a normalizing technology of ‘post-conflict’ states and their 
populations. This normalization is argued to operate through the government of 
‘post-conflict’ states and their populations’ lives at a global scale. The whole 
rhetoric, mechanisms and instruments of the state-building processes are portrayed 
as directed to the prevention and transformation of violent conflicts. Nevertheless, 
the state-building dispositif9 is a normalizing technology that ends up disciplining 
the ‘post-conflict’ states and biopolitically governing their populations. At the 
international level, this government operates through discipline, which works 
through instruments of knowing, assessing, monitoring, individualizing, ranking, 
rewarding and punishing individual ‘post-conflict’ states. These include 
standardized data collection, performance benchmarking, auditing techniques, 
access to credit lines, funding of projects, conditionalities, sanctions, and so on. At 
the national level, government operates through biopolitics, which functions 
through the administration and control of life-supporting processes of the mass 
population, such as health, education, sanitation, movement, life, death, jobs, food, 
and so on, in these ‘post-conflict’ states. As a normalizing technology, the state-
building dispositif has a norm underpinning its activities which is the ultimate aim 
of its conducts. This norm is that the states should resemble liberal democracies. 
                                                            
9 Usually the word dispositif used by Foucault is translated as ‘apparatus’ to English. Nevertheless, in order to 
avoid translation discussions or misperceptions (Kelly, 2009: 174, footnote 12), this paper uses the original 
word ‘dispositif’. 
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Usually, state-building is considered by problematizing each aspect of it or 
the performance of specific actors performing determined activities, and not the 
process as a whole. Consequently, what is usually visible is the observation of the 
constitution-building efforts, the processes of money lending by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), feeding by World Food Program (WFP), security sector 
reforms, housing construction by the HABITAT, electoral processes assistance, 
development activities by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the 
financing of reconstruction efforts by World Bank (WB) and so on, individually. It 
is seeking precisely to avoid this discrete and partial observation of the state-
building processes that this paper uses the notion of state-building dispositif. 
 
DISPOSITIF 
 
Although not offering a complete definition, Foucault comes close to it while 
delineating what a dispositif is in an interview (Agamben, 2009: 2). He said:  
 
What I'm trying to pick out with this term is, firstly, a thoroughly 
heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural 
forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific 
statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions - in short, 
the said as much as the unsaid . Such are the elements of the apparatus. 
The apparatus itself is the system of relations that can be established 
between these elements. 
[…] I understand by the term 'apparatus' a sort of - shall we say - formation 
which has as its major function at a given historical moment that of 
responding to an urgent need. The apparatus thus has a dominant strategic 
function.  
[…] I said that the apparatus is essentially of a strategic nature, which means 
assuming that it is a matter of a certain manipulation of relations of forces, 
either developing them in a particular direction, blocking them, stabilizing 
them, utilizing them, etc. […] This is what the apparatus consists in: 
strategies of relations of forces supporting, and supported by, types of 
knowledge (Foucault, 1980 194-196). 
 
With this in mind, to conceptualize the state-building as a dispositif brings 
a more comprehensive appreciation of the whole process than understanding it 
merely as a conflict-resolution tool. The elements of this state-building dispositif 
would be all the actors, theories, discourses, concepts, practices, instruments, 
institutions and so on, that are deployed to the shaping and conducting of ‘post-
conflict’ states and their populations. This notion facilitates the understanding of 
distinct actions, experts, practices, procedures, concepts that may not be 
interrelated at all, and in fact could be very much conflicting, as part of one 
comprehensive and coherent whole. 
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OPERATING ACTORS AND CONCEPTS 
 
Regarding the actors one might think of many agents that are part of this state-
building dispositif. Those might be major organizations like the UN and its 
specialized agencies, the OSCE, the EU, the NATO, the OECD, other regional 
organizations, international financial institutions such as the IMF and WB, and 
national development agencies/departments like the USAID, AUSAID or the 
DFIF. Additionally, one might also think about the international non-
governmental organizations (INGOs) that operate in ‘post-conflict’ scenarios, the 
consultants and experts hired for specific tasks, and also the local people and 
NGOs of the countries under state-building. Surely, all these actors operate 
different tasks, through diverse mechanisms and most often with distinct and, not 
rarely, conflicting objectives. Nevertheless, they all operate within this state-
building dispositif. 
In order to operate smoothly, this state-building dispositif must make use 
of a set of theories and concepts. Perhaps the first operating concept is the notion 
of ‘failed state’. This concept is at the heart of the very existence and need of the 
state-building dispositif. As already mentioned, the state-building emerges in the 
international scene in order to address the question of ‘fragility’, and this notion is 
operationalized through the conceptualization of ‘failed states’. The concept 
emerges when the orthodox thinking, observing the international scene, 
problematizes the ‘fragility’ and the ‘lack of capacity’ of some state structures, or 
the ‘bad governance’ of them (Doornbos, 2006: 2) as source of both insecurity and 
underdevelopment. These states are ‘failed’ because they «no longer perform the 
[basic] functions required for them to pass as states» (Zartman, 1995: 5). These 
functions range from the provision of welfare and security to the border patrol and 
the rule-of-law enforcement. The state capacity to provide these functions is, 
therefore, central to this notion (Hill, 2005: 145). According to the state-builders 
rationale, with these states unwilling (Gros, 1996), or even unable (Jackson, 2000), 
to perform such critical tasks, it is wide open the space for them to become 
«source of many of the world’s most serious problems, from poverty to AIDS to 
drugs to terrorism» (Fukuyama, 2004 at pp. ix). 
This ‘failed state’ notion is very much connected with another operating 
concept of this state-building dispositif which is the reinterpretation of the concept 
of sovereignty. The idea of sovereignty always was the very bedrock of 
international relations. Nevertheless, a problematization focused on the state 
(in)capacity could hardly be developed without a differentiation and 
(re)categorization of the concept of sovereignty. One might think, for instance, of 
positive and negative sovereignty (Jackson, 1990). The positive sovereignty is the 
possession of state characteristics de facto and de jure whereas the negative one is the 
absence of the de facto characteristics (Hill, 2005 146). In this rationale, it is precisely 
this “gap between de jure sovereignty and de facto sovereignty [that] is the key 
obstacle to ensuring global security and prosperity” (Ghani et al., 2005: 4). 
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These two operating concepts work together constructing the urgent need 
which the state-building dispositif must address. Connecting these two concepts, 
on the one hand, the state-building dispositif, while designed to address ‘fragility’, 
becomes urgently needed in order to enhance international security and wellbeing 
of global populations. On the other hand, while being portrayed as closing the 
‘post-conflict’ states’ ‘sovereignty gap’, the state-building is not viewed as an 
external intervention. In fact, it is viewed as enhancing ‘post-conflict’ states 
capacity. Indeed, the state-building dispositif is presented as a beneficial 
relationship between the state-builders and state-built actors in the sense that the 
former are ‘reinforcing’ the sovereignty and independence of the latter. The former 
are portrayed as intervening and enhancing the de facto capacities of the states while 
these still maintain their de jure sovereignty. 
Another notion that is important to the operation of the state-building 
dispositif is ‘good governance’. The idea of ‘governance’ frames the area of 
intervention. For the World Bank, governance means «the manner in which power 
is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources for 
development» (1992: 92). Despite the importance of the term ‘governance’, what is 
the key operative word on the notion is the adjective ‘good’. Here, whereas the 
financial institutions emphasize specific macro-economic reforms, the political 
ones place more attention to democratic principles, human rights and rule of law 
(Wouters e Ryngaert, 2005: 69-77). The implicit idea of this ‘good governance’ 
notion is that the ‘bad’ and ‘inappropriate’ governance that must be corrected so 
they can become ‘good’. This correction would come through economic, political 
and social reforms such as the reduction of trading barriers and tariffs, 
privatization of state-owned properties, deregulation and liberalization of the 
economy, marketization of public services, budgetary discipline, respect for human 
rights, NGO engagement, rule of law and so on (Wouters e Ryngaert, 2005: 73; 
Zanotti, 2005: 468). This is a key element of the ‘normalization’ process under 
which ‘post-conflict’ states and their populations performed by the state-building 
dispositif. 
 
NORMALIZATION 
 
Problematizing the state-building dispositif as a normalizing technology surely 
needs a delineation of what is meant by ‘technology’ and ‘normalization’. The word 
‘technology’ is herein used to capture the very essence of state-building processes. 
The pivotal element about technologies, in a Foucauldian sense, is that «they are 
technologies, not merely structures or discourses of power, though there are 
certainly discourses and structures involved». This means that «they are, like other 
technologies, a body of technical knowledge and practices, a raft of techniques, 
which once developed and understood can be applied to various situations». 
Additionally, they «are not socially or politically neutral but rather profoundly alter 
the way things operate in society» (Kelly, 2009: 43-44). Hence, the word 
‘technology’ is used to place emphasis on the standardized character of the state-
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building processes. Whereas the international conflicts have diverse characteristics, 
the answer to them usually passes precisely through the inverse – uniformity. The 
state-building became a standardized conflict-resolution mechanism applied 
indiscriminately throughout different ‘post-conflict’ scenarios across the world 
(Clapham, 1998), being even referenced as a «standard operation procedure» 
(Ramsbotham, 2000: 170). 
Regarding normalization, from the start, this notion operates through an 
underpinning ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ condition. In the normalization process, one 
has «different curves of normality, and the operation of normalization consists in 
establishing an interplay between these different distributions of normality and [in] 
acting to bring the most unfavorable in line with the more favorable» (Foucault, 
[1978] 2007: 91). In a few words, the ‘abnormal’ ones must be intervened to 
become more like the ‘normal’ ones (Idem). Hence, in a normalization process, the 
‘normal’ is the primary element and the norm which the others must follow is 
deduced from it. In the international sphere, it is clear who the ‘normal’ and 
‘abnormal’ are. The ‘normal’ condition is associated with the Western-liberal-
democratic states, while the ‘abnormal’ with the other states. This ‘normal’ 
condition rests on the notion, previously alluded, that the liberal and democratic 
principles and institutions bring a pacifying effect. The ‘norm’, according to which 
the states should resemble liberal democracies, is deduced from this notion. 
It is precisely at this normalization process that the ‘failed state’ notion 
works perfectly. This is an a contrario concept, that is, it encompasses a subliminal, 
unspoken, dichotomy of what is a ‘successful’/’normal’ state (Pureza et al., 2007: 
3), which is the liberal-democratic one. The ‘failed states’ are thus portrayed as 
‘abnormal’ states through analogies like «degenerative disease» (Zartman, 1995: 8), 
«serious mental or physical illness» (Helman e Rather, 1992: 12), or even «dead 
leaves that accumulate in a forest» (Krasner e Pascual, 2005: 155). Hence, to 
normalize these ‘abnormal’ states is to find instruments to implement this liberal-
democracy ‘norm’ there. Therefore, the state-building dispositif emerges as a fit 
instrument to intervene in these states in order to normalize them and their 
populations, to make them resemble more like liberal democracies. Since this 
normalization process carried out by the state-building dispositif occurs through 
the government of the ‘post-conflict’ states, operated through discipline, and their 
populations’ lives, operated through biopolitics, these conceptual tools must also 
be better elucidated. 
 
GOVERNMENT 
 
Reading the word ‘government’ one of the very first things that might come to 
mind is, quite understandably, the state and the wide range of institutions it 
involves. Nevertheless, the Foucauldian understanding of government seeks 
exactly to develop an analytical framework that enables the reflection of the 
political power exercised precisely outside, above, permeating, across and beyond 
the state (Rose e Miller, 1992; Larner e Walters, 2004: 2). Briefly defining 
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government as the ‘conduct of conduct’ (Foucault, [1982] 2000: 341), Foucault 
enlarges its meaning to cover the scope adopted here, viz. «mechanisms and 
procedures destined to conduct men, to drive the conduct of men, to conduct the 
conduct of men»10 ([1980] 2009: 18). Understanding government as the ‘conduct of 
conduct’, Foucault notoriously plays with the double meaning of the word 
‘conduct’ and consciously sees it as «one of the best aids for coming to terms with 
the specificity of power relations» (Ibid, [1982] 2000: 341). Whereas as a verb, ‘to 
conduct’, means to lead, to guide or to direct, as a noun, ‘conduct’ refers to the 
human actions and behaviors (Dean, 2010: 17). Connecting these two meanings, 
government as ‘conduct of conduct’ «entails any attempt to shape with some 
degree of deliberation aspects of our behaviour according to particular sets of 
norms and for a variety of ends» (Ibidem: 18). 
Therefore, government in the Foucauldian sense is much more than the 
mere management of the state structures. Indeed, to govern, in this sense, means 
«to structure the possible field of action of others» (Foucault, [1982] 2000: 341). 
Hence, government becomes an activity that does not operates solely at the state 
level, but also turns out to be apparent in the every-day aspects and places of an 
ordinary life such as at schools, factories, hospitals, business enterprises, religious 
sites, families and so on. Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that government 
works simultaneously and complementarily with other Foucauldian technologies of 
power such as discipline and biopolitics. 
 
DISCIPLINE AND BIOPOLITICS 
 
During the modern period Foucault observes the emergence of two technologies 
of power: ‘discipline’ and ‘biopower’. They are powers that are exercised through 
correcting and enhancing life respectively. A key understanding of those technologies of 
power visualized by Foucault is that they operate in different levels and scales, and 
through different instruments. This fact is what allows one technology to exist 
without the extinction of the other. Indeed, it allows that these technologies can 
function simultaneously. 
Discipline is a technology of power that is essentially exercised on 
individuals and mainly concerned with the production of their behaviors. 
Therefore, it can be understood as a micro-political power (Kelly, 2009: 43). 
Discipline is a type of power that is very much connected to the notion, previously 
presented, of normalization. Indeed, the ultimate aim of discipline is to normalize. 
It is in essence a process that seeks to correct the behaviors of deviant individuals. 
The operative word here is certainly the adjective deviant. In this sense, the 
disciplinary mechanism visualizes what should be the correct behavior and mold the 
incorrect ones toward this model. 
                                                            
10 Translation by the author. In the original: “mecanismos e procedimentos destinados a conduzir os homens, 
a dirigir a conduta dos homens, a conduzir a conduta dos homens” (Foucault, [1980] 2009: 18). 
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Underpinning this disciplinary mechanism there are the processes of 
individualization and ranking. The individualization process is the one that makes 
sure that a mass of subjects can be treated individually. Nevertheless, through 
ranking, these individuals are always problematized in relation to other individuals. 
Hence, rank definition is a key element of the process (Zanotti, 2008: 552). In fact, 
«discipline is the ark of rank» (Foucault, [1975] 1995: 146); it is through ranking 
that discipline can hierarchizes the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ or ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ 
individuals in relation to one another (Ibidem: 181). The closest the individual is 
from the adopted ‘norm’, the better ranked he/she is. Hence, those with low ranks 
must be intervened in order to resemble more like those better ranked. The 
ranking «has a double role: it marks the gaps, hierarchizes qualities, skills and 
aptitudes, but it also punishes and rewards» (Idem). It is through the punishing and 
rewarding technique that ‘abnormal’ behaviors are molded and corrected, and the 
‘normal’ ones invested and stimulated. Through this process, the individuals are 
«situated in a network of relations and defined by their position within it. […] 
[R]anks reinforces discipline through mechanisms of reward/punishment such as 
promotion/demotion; [it] establishes systems of performance assessment and 
comparison linked to measurable criteria» (Zanotti, 2008: 552). Hence, discipline 
constantly «compares, differentiates, hierarchizes, homogenizes, excludes. In short, 
it normalizes» (Foucault, [1975] 1995: 183). 
On the opposite pole of discipline, biopower operates on a macro-political 
level. It is exercised on the collectivity having the population as its target (Kelly, 
2009: 43). It is a power concerned with men as a living-being (Foucault, [1976] 
2003: 242); hence it is fundamentally exercised on the population’s life. Therefore, 
rather than an «anatomo-politics of the human body» what is perceived is a 
«’biopolitics’ of the human race» (Ibidem: 243). Biopolitics thus aims to «the 
management and regulation of the population, the species body and its 
demographic characteristics» (Smart, 2002: 99). It is a power that seeks the 
management and the administration of the processes of life at the level of the 
population. 
Hence, biopolitics starts to problematize a whole set of phenomena that 
bind the population together, that makes it a whole. It problematizes all the «the 
mechanisms of life and serving as the basis of the biological processes» (Foucault, 
[1976] 1978: 139). Biopolitics is concerned thus with phenomena like birth, death, 
production, illness, fertility, health, life expectancy, housing, education and so on, 
and with all the conditions that might influence them (Idem; Duffield, 2007: 6). Hence, 
biopolitics acts in two directions: not only at the life-supporting processes per se, but 
also at theirs surrounding conditions, at the environment that influences those pro-
cesses. Ultimately, biopolitics acts where the population’s lives might be sustained 
or retarded (Dean, 2010: 119). Hence, the emergence of such power designates 
precisely «the moment at which the complex phenomena of human existence were 
submitted to the calculation and order of knowledge and power» (Smart, 2002: 99). 
Whereas discipline had as its ultimate goal to correct the deviant individual, 
biopolitics targets the life-supporting processes in order to invest and foster life. Its 
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ultimate goal is to enhance life quality and its conditions. Hence, the objective is 
not to kill or correct the individual, but to intervene at the level of the generality of 
the life-supporting phenomena. To intervene in such a way, biopolitics makes use 
of instruments, techniques and institutions different from discipline’s instruments. 
This happens through the implementation of a whole set of instruments and 
institutions that ensure the enhancement of vital processes of the population. 
Regarding the instruments, one might think of all the instruments directed to mass 
populations like «forecasts, statistical estimates, and overall measures» (Foucault, 
[1976] 2003: 246) and «techniques of mass surveillance, such as the census, and of 
mass control, such as health campaigns» (Kelly, 2009: 43). Regarding the 
institutions, one might think, for instance, of health, education, welfare, 
employment, sanitation or feeding systems (Dean, 2010: 29). 
Apart from those instruments and institutions, biopolitics makes also use 
of the notion of average. Through the establishment of averages, what biopolitics 
seeks is to preserve an equilibrium intervening on the deviations. It is with this in 
mind that one can think that «the mortality rate has to be modified or lowered; life 
expectancy has to be increased; [or] the birth rate has to be stimulated» (Foucault, 
[1976] 2003: 246). In doing so, biopolitics takes control of the vital processes of 
‘man-as-species’ and as a result life can be fostered and consequently managed, so 
life ends up being regularized (Ibidem: 247) and normalized. Here, the norm also 
plays a key role, since it circulates between both discipline and biopolitics (Ibidem: 
253). As Foucault properly remembers, «[t]he norm is something that can be 
applied to both a body one wishes to discipline and a population one wishes to 
regularize» (Idem).  
As already mentioned, these technologies of power might operate 
simultaneous and complementarily. To clarify this, Foucault alludes to the image of 
a triangle composed by these technologies which has the population as its target 
([1978] 2007: 143). As such, power can be exercised at the conduction of behaviors 
and conducts, of individuals and populations at once, ensuring the discipline and 
regulation of each and all of them at once (Rose, 1999: 23). In sum, it becomes a 
more complete and comprehensive process of normalization. 
Extrapolating this line of thought to the international scenario, it is not 
unreasoned to visualize this normalizing mechanism in full activity, for instance, in 
the post-conflict reconstruction efforts. One might think, for instance, about all 
the adjustments and restructurings carried out on these states. In this sense, the 
state-building becomes, more than a mere conflict-resolution instrument, a very 
comprehensive normalizing dispositif which aims to intervene in the ‘post-conflict’ 
states seeking to normalize them, to make them to behave in accordance to an 
established ‘norm’. Not only the state per se, but also their relationship with their 
own populations and how the populations itself should behave are intervened and 
normalized. Consequently, not only the ‘post-conflict’ states are disciplined 
through rewards and punishments instruments that aim to correct their ‘deviant’ 
behavior, and then make these states behave ‘accordingly’, but also their 
populations are conducted in such a way that their lives are regularized and 
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managed, that they also start to behave ‘properly’. Such regulation occurs 
essentially through the biopolitical power exercised over all aspects that surround 
and maintain their lives. 
The notions of ‘failed states’ and ‘good governance’, as already mentioned 
previously, have a key role in the process. The former not only makes that the 
state-building dispositif emerges as a proper solution to insecurities in the 
international scenario, but also it is a sort of negative parameter, essential in the 
ranking processes of the states. It is precisely while characterizing certain states as 
‘failed’ that one is, subliminally and essentially, raking this state in comparison with 
other states. More than that, this raking process is done while intimately 
connecting the ‘failure’ of these states with the international insecurities and 
underdevelopments. 
Such mechanism creates the necessity of reforming these states and 
correcting their behaviors so they stop being ‘failed’. Moreover, these corrections 
and interventions are portrayed as a beneficial relationship due to the possibilities 
open by the reinterpretations of sovereignty. Consequently, numerous economic, 
political and social reforms are carried out, in light of the notion of ‘good 
governance’, aiming that these states stop being a threat to the international 
system. It is in this framework that should be perceived, for instance, all the 
structural adjustments imposed by the IMF, stimulating certain kinds of economic 
conducts, and blocking others, by the ‘post-conflict’ states through, for example, 
the concession (or denial) of funding and credits to these states. In essence, it is 
aimed that the economy in general behaves in a determinate form.  
One might also think on the vast and profound reforms in the political 
sphere such as, for instance, the creation of whole juridical, legislative and 
executive systems, when not in fact exercising these powers11, the constitution 
writing, the definition of electoral systems, the passing of laws and so on. On the 
social sphere, it is clear, for instance, the management of a variety of key areas of 
the lives of the populations in question, going from the movement on the territory, 
to the education, health, feeding, demographics, housing, jobs, to name a few. 
Under this framework, all these actions are essentially conductions of conducts 
which have the objective of stimulate, or not, certain kinds of behaviors, so the 
politics and the population in general behave accordingly. Intervening on both 
levels, the state and the population, the state-building dispositif places both in a 
complex power network which the objective is to conduct their conducts so they 
can become more similar to a liberal-democratic state and population. 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This paper had the objective of initiate the discussion to argue for a 
problematization of the state-building process through the reflections and 
theoretical tools of Michel Foucault. Perhaps the main benefit of this endeavor is 
                                                            
11 The case of Timor-Leste is emblematic in this sense since external actors, in this case the UN, had all the 
juridical, legislative and executive powers over the territory. 
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the major possibilities open by his reflections about the exercise of power. It 
enables, for instance, the exposition of power being operationalized in 
relationships, institutions and situations that could be, at a first sight, apparently 
neutral and impartial. 
Departing from the theoretical tools herein presented, it is possible to start 
to problematize the state-building as a normalizing dispositif at global scale; as a 
process of government which occurs at the level of the ‘post-conflict’ states, 
through their discipline, and their populations through the biopolical power 
exercised over their lives. Obviously, the next step following this initial 
problematization would be the effective exposition of the functioning of these 
tools while observing a concrete case. In this sense, some paths might be 
delineated. At the state level, the discipline would be perceived mapping out 
instruments of knowing, assessing, monitoring, individualizing, codifying, ranking, 
rewarding and punishing individual ‘post-conflict’ states. Those might be majorly 
elements like maps, standardized data collection/reporting, statistics benchmarks, 
performance indicators, auditing techniques, accesses to lines of credit, project 
funding, conditionalities, even sanctions. This entails elucidating aspects such as: 
through what mechanisms the UN engagement is monitored; how 
‘progress’/‘regression’ is assessed; what sort of projects are more likely to be 
financed/rejected, or initiatives to be encouraged/discredited. It aims at clarifying 
the kinds of conduct that the ‘post-conflict’ state is subject to rewards/ punish-
ments, elucidating how, when, and through what instruments the incentives/ 
corrections occur. 
At the population’s level, it could be delineated the activities carried out on 
the economic, political, social and security spheres. It could be mapped out, for 
example, the processes of writing constitution, the kind of laws formulated, and 
how the executive, judicial and legislative systems are constituted. It would involve 
also the elucidation of the actions fostering the ‘post-conflict’ populations’ life, 
managing and controlling life-supporting processes of the mass population of the 
‘post-conflict’ intervened state. Evincing biopolitics would entail elucidating the 
practices performed in areas such as births, health, sanitation, education, jobs, 
movement on the territory, feeding, demography, and so on. It would involve a 
mapping of instruments and processes that influence, shape and conduct the 
population’s lives. 
Instead of understanding all these distinct spheres of state-building 
activities as individual activities, it could be more clarifying to problematize all 
these practices as part of a state-building dispositif. In this way, it would be clearer 
that these activities often end up disciplining the ‘post-conflict’ state and 
biopolitically governing their populations. Rather than disparate and sometimes 
conflicting activities, they all aim to normalize the ‘post-conflict’ state and their 
populations. Ultimately, they are all part of a normalization process which aims to 
implement a non-written ‘norm’ in the international system, which is that the states 
should all resemble liberal democracies. 
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